The combined intelligence budget of the UK, the USA and their immediate English speaking allies is now approaching 100 billion dollars a year. These countries, often referred to as the "Five Eyes" alliance, are almost unique in their complex approach to the making of intelligence-led national security policy. They not only privilege the ability to access remarkable volumes of secret information but also prioritise the abilities to store, analyse and process it a sophisticated way that aids decision-making. Moreover, the premiers, politicians and policy-makers who enjoy this unique high-grade support are, in turn, involved in a constant process of tasking and improving the intelligence machine. 1 In short, Western intelligence has a central brain. The UK and the USA in particular have been unusual in devoting so much resource to the collection and elaborate processing of information about its foreign adversaries. This represents the application of a particular type of information to leverage their economic, military and diplomatic power: indeed some intelligence theorists have argued that intelligence actually constitutes an additional form of state power. 2 In many other states around the world, the orientation of intelligence has often been inward facing, with a high priority given to regime security. Indeed with "intelligence elsewhere", it is not uncommon for the secret services conceive of themselves as the enforcement arm of the ruling party rather than as a branch of government. Some would argue that what really gives the UK and the USA the edge is complex management and analytical functions associated with the core executive that have evolved over the best part of a century. Others would argue that this process has been over-expensive and has underdelivered, not least in the last decade. Either way, the debates about development of the central brain of Western security policy are of the first importance and fortunately this discussion is advanced by several important new studies. Committee. 3 In addition there have been new official histories of the Special Operations Executive, focused mostly on Italy, documenting, amongst other things, a British plot to assassinate Mussolini and plans to arm the Mafia. 4 As a general phenomenon, and balanced by unofficial accounts, official history contributes significantly to the public understanding of intelligence. 5 Many more people read these narratives than peruse the asterisk-ridden reports of Sir Malcolm Rifkind's Intelligence and Security Committee. Opening up secret archives to independently-minded historians is not just an afterthought; it is an important part of accountability, even oversight, albeit security considerations sometimes require this final audit to take place long after the fact. 6 Nevertheless, official accounts should be approached with some circumspection. Sir Herbert Butterfield, one of the most distinguished philosophers of history, reflected that:
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'governments try to press upon the historian the key to all the drawers but one, and are very anxious to spread the belief that this single one contains no secrets of importance'. Butterfield was almost certainly reflecting on Britain's elaborate and successful efforts to hide the Bletchley Park from the public gaze for a quarter of century. 7 He expended little energy running the war, but had plenty of time for bridge, lavish dinner parties and country weekends. Two or three times a day he wrote long and elaborate love letters to his mistress, who was thirty year's his junior. 12 Cabinet Meetings of a sort occurred but these were long rambling conversations with no agenda, no minutes and no action points.
Lloyd George finally brought order in 1916 in the form of Maurice Hankey, the first Cabinet
Secretary, who together with his assistant Thomas Jones, literally created the machinery of Cabinet Government. 13 Oddly, despite conjuring into existence almost every aspect of the modern Cabinet Office machine, the missing element was any central mechanism for The choice of an Anglo-American subject has a certain irony here, since Davies is one of number academics that have urged us to make an effort to look beyond the "Anglosphere". 20 On the one hand, one might yearn for a book that compares say, the intelligence wiring of advancing countries like India, China and Brazil. On the other hand, one has to concede that the comparison of the entire systems of two countries is a complex business and this study works well precisely because most readers will be specialists who bring a certain amounts of prior knowledge of Western national security architectures to the subject. There is another sense in which these two case studies are appropriate: both countries have been challenged by significant intelligence failure in the last decade, not least round the notorious the issue of the missing WMD. Whitehall and Washington have been required to mount simultaneous and searching enquiries followed by extensive reform and this strengthens the rational for comparison. 21 The time span is colossal, tracing the respective stories from their modern origins in account of the organisation of the vast Western secret apparatus that we are likely to have for a long time. Indeed, this is not so much an account of the central brain of intelligence, it is more an account of the whole nervous system, since Davies sets out to capture the wider wiring of both communities, with its myriad of co-ordinating bodies, together with its intelligence culture. His focus is therefore rather different to Goodman, charting instead the intricate linking machinery well beyond that of the JIC and its equivalent mechanisms in the USA. As such the respective volumes produced by these two authors are quite different in character and stand as complementary texts rather than obvious competitors.
Davies utilises classic social science in the sense that he wishes to look at two systems that are quite similar and then seeks to explain the differences. Although these two intelligence communities share similar roles within government and have similar break-points in terms of major international challenges, they have operated rather differently. Davies tackles the fascinating question of why there is much more conflict and rivalry inside the US system, arguing that it is only partly a function of size: certainly the larger something is the more entropy and the less collegiality one might reasonably expect. Issues of size and staffing have traditionally been used to explain the famous "Beltway Battles" of the US intelligence system. Other notable American characteristics include a generous budget that has allowed the US to indulge in phenomenal duplication. Typically, the CIA has often had its own soldiers in the form of units like Special Activities Division, while the Pentagon has its own spies, boasting units such as the Intelligence Support Activity and the Defence Humint Service. Each of the service cryptanalytical arms working under the NSA has duplicated the functions of the other to some degree. Exacerbating all this, American intelligence agencies have often been headed by political or military figures whose time in the intelligence community is likely to be brief and are therefore ready and willing to cut their competitors off at the knees. By contrast, the Whitehall community is more civilianised and mostly consists of those with a lifelong career invested the business and who have a stronger interest in promoting collegiality. 22 For UK readers, the more contemporary sections will be especially compelling. The UK and the Iraq War is dealt with in masterly way in a chapter entitled "Deaf captains Pick
Cherries". Prime Minister Tony Blair does not emerge from this analysis particularly well and it is likely that we will have to wait sometime yet for signs of Blair revisionism, at least in the intelligence sphere. 23 The post-Blair analysis is even more fascinating since it amounts almost to a narrative of the death of the JIC. This is remarkable and Davies himself says, all the more remarkable for the fact that so few people have remarked on it, since the UK's central intelligence machinery has enjoyed a certain amount of veneration and overseas it has been envied and emulated. However both Gordon Brown and David Cameron consciously sought to distance themselves from the Blair era and so opted for radical change. Cameron's changes may have seriously challenged the centrality of the JIC, but intelligence has never been more important to the core executive. Indeed, David Cameron has described himself as 'the Minister for the Intelligence Services' and is vigorously and publicly committed to defend their effectiveness. (pronounced 'Fear') was surely the most enviable job-title ever created in Whitehall. 
